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I~I 11-IE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~\LIC~ ~\lc.J l1 :\KlN. forrnerly ALICE ' 
HOD RIG liEZ, and l\1 Y HN A RODRI-~ 
GUEZ, a ntinor, by her guardian ALIClG 
~IrJVNKIN, 
Pl:~~::fs and Appellants, \ 
HAZI~~L CHASE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BHII~I~-, OF APPI~LLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ca~e K o. 
91fi() 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
All italics are our:-;. 
l\:lyrna Rodriguez, a Ininor, by her guardian, her 
mother, brought this action against Hazel Chase, the 
defendant, for personal injuries. She suffered these in-
juries on account of an accident which occurred whilf:' 
she was riding as a guest on a motorcycle driven by 
one Y ern on Green on July 5, 1958. The motorcycle was 
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2 
going north on I Street, a through highway, and the 
automobile driven by Hazel Chase was being driven in 
a westerly direction on Eleventh A venue. 
The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that defendant 
(a) Failed to yield right of \Yay. 
(b) Failed to keep a proper lookout. 
(c) Failed to remain stopped at the stop sign 
on the east side of I Street until the motor-
cycle on which plaintiff was riding had 
crossed the intersection. 
(d) Failed to keep her automobile under proper 
control. 
(e) Operated said autmnobile crossing said in-
tersection at a speed too high for existing 
conditions. (R. 1-3). 
Defendant answered plaintiffs' complaint and ad-
mitted only that there was an accident, and denied any 
negligence on the part of the defendant, and claimed 
that plaintiff's injury \Yas caused by the negligence of 
\'"ern on Green, her host driver, and also defendant 
elaimed plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence 
(R. 6). 
The case carne on for pretrial on the 19th day of 
February, 1959. Plaintiffs' and defendant's contentions 
were set out at the pretrial. Yery little ·was stipulated 
to except as to the hospital bill. The defendant put the 
plaintiff to her proof that I Street is a through street. 
The case cmne on for trial the 22nd day of April, 
1959. The jury was impaneled and proceeded to trial 
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on that day, and continued on the 23rd and 24th. 
The following is a list of exhibits offered in evidence. 
Fnless otherwise indicated, they were received. 
Exhibit 1, a map of the locality. 
Exhibits 2 to 9, inclusive, plaintiffs' exhibits, photos 
taken by plaintiff's witness Tipton of the locality. 
Exhibits 10 through 13 were hospital records and 
X-rays. 
Exhibits 1-±, 15, 1G, and 17, photos of defendant's 
car taken by Shipler. 
Exhibits 18, 19, 20 and 21, defendant's photos of 
motorcycle taken by defendant's witness Shipler. 
Exhibit 22, U. S. "\veather report. 
Exhibit 24, picture of plaintiff with cast on her leg. 
Exhibits 25, 2G, and 27, photos of the locality taken 
by defendant's witness Shipler. 
Exhibits 28, 29, and 30, additional photos taken by 
defendant's witness Shipler of defendant's car. 
The plaintiff submitted request for instructionH. 
Requested Instruction No. 1 was a request for a directed 
verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant (R. 13). 
"\Y e will set out those portions of the court's instruc-
tions excepted to by the plaintiff and also No. 11. 
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A part of Im;truction No. 1 
As a second affinnative defense the defend-
ant alleges that the plaintiff herself was guilty 
of contributory negligence which proximately 
eontributed to her injuries and as a third af-
firmative defense that the plaintiff entered upon 
the trip with her driver Vernon Green and that 
she by reason of the circumstances assumed the 
risk of injury and damage to her person under 
<~ertain circumstances as follows: 
(a) By continuing to ride on the Inotorcycle 
w!1en it was being driven at an excessive rate of 
:-;peed and in a n1anner showing that the driver 
<'ould not control it, or bring it to a stop in the 
{:)vent of danger; and 
(b) Also by failing to protest and failing 
to get off the vehicle before the accident occurred: 
' R. 45--16). 
Instruction No. ;) 
The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. An 
unavoidable accident is one which occurs in such 
a 1nanner that it cannot justly be said to have 
been proximately caused by negligence as those 
tenns are herein defined. In the event a party is 
da1naged by an unavoidable accident, he has no 
right to recover, since the law requires that a 
person be injured by the fault or negligence of 
another as a prerequisite to any right to recover 
dmnages. (R. 51) 
Instruction No. 11 
't ou are instructed that .Myrna Rodriguez, 
the plaintiff, was a guest of Yernon Green on the 
motorcycle at the time of the accident, and that 
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any negligence, if any, of the driver of the motor-
cyele cannot he imputed to her. 
The fact that Vernon Green is not a party 
to this case should not be considered by you in 
deterrnining any of the issues. (R. 58) 
Instruction No. 1:~ 
}~vidence has been received bearing on the 
eondud of Green, driver of the 1notorcycle on 
wnie:1 plaintiff, l\Iyrna RoJriguez, was riding at 
the ti1ne of the accident. You should not pern1it 
yoo.lr consideration of that evidence to direct your 
attention away from the rule of law; namely, 
that if the plaintiff i~ otherwise entitled to re-
cover against the defendant, such right would not 
be barred b)- negligence on the part of Gree11 
unless such negligence, if any, was the sole proxi-
mate enuse of the accident. 
r':vidence concerning Green's conduct has 
lwc:1 received and is relevant in this case because 
the defendant claims not only that said Green 
was negligent, but that his negligence was the 
sole proxiwale cause of the accident. If that 
claim is true, then the defendant may not he held 
liable. 
How ever, if you find frmn the preponderance 
of evidence that both :Mr. Green and the defend-
ant, l\Irs. Chase, were negligent and the negli-
gence of both was the proxirnate cause of the 
accident, then you will find for the plaintiff unless 
she 1ras also neglvgent which proximately contrilJ-
uted t'J tl!f col!isi'on. (R. GO) (The italicized por-
tion \',-[l;.< written in by rl2 court.) 
Instruction No. 1() 
T:1ere is a legal prineiple (•omm<ml~· refe1T0:l 
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to by the term "assumption of risk," which is 
as follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when she volun-
tarily manifests her assent to the creation or 
rnaintenance of a dangerous condition and volun-
tarily exposes herself to that danger, or when 
she knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care 
would know, that a danger exists in either the 
condition of another, or in the condition, use, or 
operation of property and voluntarily places 
herself or remains, within the position of danger. 
One who has thus assumed a risk is not 
entitled to recover for damage caused her without 
intention and which results fron1 the dangerous 
condition or conduct to which she thus exposed 
herself. (R. 63). 
Instruction X o. 17 
For clarification in reference to the question 
of negligence respecting ~Irs. Chase, Vernon 
Green, and :Myrna Rodriguez, if any, you are in-
structed that any negligence proximately causing 
the incident in question would operate as follows: 
1. If l\Irs. Chase is negligent and it proxi-
rnately caused the injury to plaintiff then plain-
tiff can recover. 
2. If :Mrs. Chase and ,~ern on Green were 
both negligent and each proximately contributed 
to the injury of the plaintiff, then the plaintiff 
can recover. 
3. If all three parties were negliJgent and 
each proximately contributed to the plaintiff's 
injuries then the plaiutiff cannot reco rer. 
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4. If the plaintiff 'leas negligent and it was 
a prox~'mate cause of her injuries she cannot 
recover. 
5. If Vernon Green was negligent and his 
negligence was the sole proximate cause the 
plaintiff cannot recover. 
G. If the plaintiff assumed the risk of dan-
ger mentioned elsewhere in these instructi,ons 
and i.t was the proximate cause of her injuries 
she cannot recover. 
Negligence without proximate cause createH 
no legal liability upon the part of the person 
who is negligent. (R. 64). 
The case was submitted to the jury on April 2-!-. 
1959, and it brought in a verdict of no cause of action 
in favor of the ,defendant. The plaintiff filed her motion 
for a new trial claiming: 
1. The verdict was contrary to law 
2. The verdict was contrary to the evidence 
3. Errors in law, and 
4. The court misdirected the jury in matters of 
law·. (R. 7 4). 
The n1otion for new trial was argued on September 
15, 1959, and promptly denied (R. 76). 
Then within the time allowed by law, the plaintiff 
filed her appeal to the Supreme Court (R. 77). Plaintiff 
made her designation of record (R. 82-83). 
STATE1IENT OF THE FACTS 
This accident occurred between 8 :30 and 8 :40 p.m. 
on July 5, 1958. The plaintiff, 1fyrna Rodriguez, was a 
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guest on a Inotorcycle driven by :Mr. Vernon Green. 
rl,he defendant, I-Iazel Chase, was driving west 0'1 
I1Jleventh Avenue. The probable point of in1pact accord-
ing to Dean L. Eskridge, a police officer, was almost 
in the exact center of the intersection. 
l Street runs north and south and Is forty feet 
fron1 curb to curb and it is a through street. Eleventh 
Aven.ue is fifty feet wide from curb to curb and there 
nrc stop signs on the northeast corner of Eleventh 
};. venue facing westbound traffic and on the southwest 
eorner of Eleventh .~A. venue facing eastbound traffi~?. 
T,he grade up I Street toward Eleventh Avenue is from 
13% to 13.2% {R. 87-102, see Exhibits 1 to 9 and :2;) 
to 27). 
Myrna Hodrir;uez, the plaintiff mmor, ',\-m' sixtee;1 
: · etn·s old at the tinw of the accident. S~:e was born in 
Puerto Rico. She had lived in Salt Lake City since she 
was three years old and attended the public schools in 
this Cit;-. 
On July 5, 1958, she was living at 77:2 Second Ave-
m~e. On that date she had been visiting at a friend's house 
and when she came hmne there was a motorcycle belong-
ing to a .Mr. Vernon Green on the la"·n in front of her 
home. She asked :Mr. Green to give her a ride and he said 
he would. She had never known ~I r. Green before, and 
had only ridden a Inotorcycle once before (R. 196-198). 
Vernon D. Green was twenty-eight years of age. He 
was a 1notorcycle 1necl1anic and had been at that business 
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!'or y('ar:-;. 1-lp had worked for the 0. & L. Equipn1ent 
Company, nwtorcycle dealers, for two years. The motor·-
eyde he had that day was in good shape (R. 211-212). 
and it was a motorcycle built for two people. 
He took ~lyrna for a ride on the rnotorcycle and 
they went west approxin1ately a quarter of a block from 
her hmne and turned north to Third A venue and pro-
ceeded west. As he turned onto Third Avenue, he started 
picking up speed and as he turned the corner :Myrna 
Rodriguez, the plaintiff, said to slow down, and he said 
"Okeh, I vvon't scare you." Then he pulled into a service 
station and purchased fifty cents worth of gas. The~· 
proceeded to I Street, stopped at the stop sign, and turned 
north on I Street (R. 213). He went up I Street, and as he 
came to the intersections he would slow down and usually 
change gears. As they left Third A venue going up 1 
~treet, the rnotorcycle was in second gear. In the center 
of the block he would usually hit third gear, then as he 
eame to an intt•n;ection he would slow down to second 
gear and r~~e the gear as a brake rather than the foot 
brake to slow df1\\"n. The speedorueter was working that 
day. As t 11P:· approached Eleventh Avenue, the motor-
t·::ele wa~ i:i1 second gear as the grade started to be steep-
er. and he was in second gear '''hen he reached the inter-
R~ction of I Street and Eleventh A venue. Between Tenth 
and Eleventh Avenue, in li[r. Green'~ opinion, he wa~ 
going about twenty-five rniles per hour (R. :Zl-l-216). 
:Jlr. Green clailned when he first saw the Chase car it 
]ooked like it "·a~ slowing down and rmning to a stop 
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(R. 217, 229 and 240), and this was about seventeen or 
twenty feet east of the stop sign (R. 232). As Mr. Green 
testified: 
"Well, as I got about here I seen a car come 
here and it looked like it was slowing down, com-
ing to a stop, and as I entered the intersection, 
I looked to the left again, knowing full well that 
there was a stop sign there, and I more or less 
took it for granted if I could see the car the car 
could see me and !mowing it had a stop sign I 
looked to the left to see if the traffic was coming 
that way and clear and then I proceeded on and 
the next thing I can remember is the car hitting 
me." (R. 217). 
Mr. Green estimated he was going approximately 
twenty-five miles per hour as he approached the inter-
section on Eleventh Avenue and when he first observed 
the Chase automobile, and his estimation of speed was 
twenty miles per hour at the time of impact. His maxi-
Inurn speed going north on I Street was thirty miles per 
hour (R. 233-234). It was just dusk as they approached 
Eleventh Avenue, and the lights of the motorcycle were 
on and had been on since leaving the R.odriguez residence 
(R. 224). 
When the accident occurred, the Chase car hit the 
last half of the motorcycle, from the engine back (R. 
224). Mr. Green was severely injured in the accident in 
the head, ann and shoulders. He was rendered uncon-
scious and probably had a brain concussion (R. 226). 
Frank A. Nichols, a schoolteacher living at 694 
Imghth A venue, saw the motorcycle going north on I 
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St rPPt. He watched the n1otorcycle go across the intersec-
tion of Eighth Avenue and about halfway up the next 
block, and the motorcycle was traveling at a safe and 
reasonable speed. He felt confident that this motorcycle 
wa8 not going faster than thirty miles per hour (R. 160-
165). 
The defendant, Hazel Chase, was called as an adverse 
witness hy the plaintiff. She was sixty-nine and a half 
years of age at the tilne of the accident, and had lived 
all her life in Salt Lake City, and for the twelve years 
preceding the trial had been Salt Lake County Recorder 
(R.166-168). She was familiar with I Street and had been 
familiar with it for many years, and she knew it was '1 
through street on account of the fire department which 
is located on the east side of I Street between Fourth 
and Fifth A venue. 
On July 5, 1958, she was driving her car, and her 
brother, John Taggart, and her nephew, Michael Taggart, 
a young boy, were in the front seat (R. 169). According 
to her brother, John Taggart, he and his sister, the de-
fendant ~Irs. Chase, were in the front seat and Michael 
was in the back seat (R. 258). Mrs. Chase was very 
familiar \vith the boulevard and she knew of the stop 
sign at I Street and Eleventh Avenue, and she knew both 
E Street and I Street and Eleventh Avenue. She knew 
that a person had to be careful crossing those intersec-
tions. She knew that approaching I Street, the visibilit~· 
is very poor. On that evening, notwithstanding it was a 
warm night in exress of 72°, she claimed that her window::: 
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were up (R. 169-171). 1frs. Chase claimed that she was 
driving closer to the north side than to the center of the 
road as she was going west on Eleventh A venue. Her 
estirnated speed as she approached I Street was approxi-
mately twenty-five 1niles per hour. She made a complete 
stop two or three feet east of the stop sign. She claimed 
sh~ t1len looked to the left, that is down I Street, then she 
looked to the north. She knew that on account of the 
visibility, the dangerous approach at that intersection 
\Vas from the south (see Exhibits :2 to 9). She claimed 
that after looking toward the south, she looked to the 
north and started across. She clai1ned she inched up to 
where she could get a better view, then she started across 
when she felt it was clear. She told Dean L. Eskridge, 
the police officer, that immediately before the impact she 
wa; going five to ten 1niles per hour (R. 139-140). 
She didn't hear the roar of the Inotorcycle and she 
didn't see any lights cmning over the hill (R. 171-178). 
:\1rs. Lois Armstrong, who was right behind her, heard 
the noise of the Inotorcycle (R. 149). 
~1rs. Chase claiined she inched out into the inter-
section and she looked to the left, that is down the hill. 
~he didn't see the 1notorcycle until the crash. As she 
~aid, "It caine out of the blue." She said she could just 
:-;ee over the brow of the hill (R. 179). Notwithstanding 
that she didn't see the motorcycle or hear its roar, she 
elaimed her eyesight and hearing were very good. :Mrs. 
Chase claimed the front of her car was in the intersection 
when the motorcycle came. As she stated: 
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"vVell, all I know 1 ·would say is that as I wa~ 
proceeding across to the center of the intersection 
all of a sudden something carne right along and 
right past the front part of rny car and it \Yas thi~ 
rnotorcycle." (R. 180-182) . 
. M r~. Cha~c stated to Dean L. I!Jskridge, a Salt Lake police 
officer: 
''I had stopped right still and I looked botlt 
ways and this motorcycle can1e out of the blue. 
I felt the motorcycle hit the car and fly across the 
street. I had barely started up." (R. 137). 
~~ rs. Chase testified that she had turned on her 
lights on the boulevard quite a distance east of I Street. 
She didn't see the motorcycle until, as she said, just about 
the collision (R. 187). She applied her brakes as soon a~ 
the impact cmne (R. 189). Mrs. Chase claimed that she 
stopped immediately after the accident, and said she had 
not been saying a word to her passengers. She got out 
of her car after the accident, walked over to the northwest 
rorner, and heard the plaintiff, Myrna, saying: 
"I told him not to go so fast. I told hirn not 
to go so fast." (R. 193) . 
. Mrs. Lois Armstrong, whose residence \\·as on the 
corner of Eleventh Avenue and H Street, was going west 
on Eleventh A venue several feet behind the Chase ca1·, 
which had stopped for the stop sign at the intersection 
of I Street and Eleventh Avenue. ~Irs. Armstrong wa~ 
driving well onto the north side of the traffic lane. Th<.) 
Chase car proceeded through the intersection very slow-
1~·. and a~ it got to the center of the intersection she sa\\ 
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the front end of the nwtorcycle einerge frorn .the right side 
of the Chase ~utomobile. The girl flew through the air 
and the boy seemed to stay with the 1notorcycle. 
As 1\frs. Armstrong said: 
""I was just approaching the stop sign to make 
1ny stop and I heard, I "·as Yery much aware of 
the noise of the motorcycle, and I couldn't tell 
where it was coming from. I could hear the noise, 
I was very aware of the noise of the motorcycle, 
but I couldn't determine which direction. And I 
remember sitting there with an apprehensive feel-
ing as a fire engine makes you feel when you hear 
the noise that you don't see." (R. 149-151). 
As ~lrs. Chase's car was just pulling away, ~Irs. Arm-
strong approached the stop sign and she heard the roar 
of the nwtorcycle. 
John Taggart, the brother of Mrs. Chase, is seventy-
four years of age. He was riding in the front seat with 
,\Irs. Chase. He didn't drive an automobile. However, he 
did drive a 1nodel-T Ford thirty years ago (R. 259-260). 
There was little conversation on his ride with :Mrs. Chase. 
As they approached the intersection, :Jirs. Chase looked 
down the hill and then she looked up the hill (R. 262-
~63). lie never heard the n1otorcycle until the crash. He 
knew there was no danger coming fron1 the north be-
cause a person could see very clearly for several blocks 
( R. 264). He saw a car on the opposite side of the street 
going east, and didn't anticipate any danger coming from 
that car. He kne~. that the only place danger could come 
from was from the ~outh. 
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The motoreyde after tl~e accident' went over to the 
earb. T.ite Chase car went two or three feet. He heard 
:\I~- rna hollering : 
"Somebody come and help rne. I told him not 
to go so fast. I told hirn not to go so fast." 
lie quoted l\lr. Green: 
"\\'e've got to get out of here.'' 
Charles J. Sorenson, on the evening of J ul:· 5, 1958, 
~aw _l\lyrna Rodriguez, the plaintiff, lying prostrate be-
tween the curb and the sidewalk, an.d he saw 1Ir. Green 
lying perfectly motionless in the gutter (R. 266-267). He 
could hear the girl screaming and crying, and when he 
got out she was still calling for help and crying. When 
~lr. Green walked toward her, she said: 
"I hate you, I hate you." 
and: 
"I told you you were going too fast" (R. 269). 
Carl H. Ahnberg, a defense witness, was a hospital 
attendant at the Y.A. Hospital at Fort Douglas. On the 
evening of the accident he was driving a 1957 Chevrolet 
automobile. His wife 'vas in the front seat and his 
mother-in-law in the back seat. He was traveling east 
on Eleve:1th A venue, and as he approached I Street 
he saw a ear on the east side.· He said it was stopped on 
the east side of I Street. l-Ie said it was parked in about 
the n1iddle of the north half of the road. He said his car 
\',·a~ about one hundred feet frorn the intersection and 
f10 Cha:~e car started. It got jllst about to the ntiddle o~ 
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the interl::iection and the motorcycle came. He said he sa'v 
the Inotorcycle just come into the intersection (R. 243-
2~16). He first saw the motorcycle when he was about 
fifty feet west of I Street, but he heard the nwtorcycle J, 
few seconds before he saw it, probably two or three 
:-;econds. _He said he saw the motorcycle travel approxi-
Inately twenty-five feet until it hit the automobile (R. 
253-254). He said he saw the motorcycle swerve to the 
west and the next thing he saw was the girl go through 
the air. He judged from watching the motorcycle travel 
twenty-five feet that it was going between forty and fifty 
1niles an hour. lie said the girl just sailed through the 
air like "Superman" and lit on the inside of the curb 
on the northwest corner. He said the girl was lying then~ 
conscious and Mr. Green staggered around and said 
"Come on, kid, let's get the hell out of here." and the 
plaintiff said: 
"I hate you. I hate you. I told you to slack 
up 1nany times." ( R. 250). 
When asked how long before the trial he spoke to 
anyone about the case, he said: 
"Oh, maybe three weeks or a month. I ain't 
just quite sure. I don't keep track of it because 
I had forgot about the accident since last fall be-
cause I didn't think we would be called in for it." 
(R. 255). 
Ellen Ahnberg, the wife of Carl Ahnberg, was with 
him in the front seat. She didn't see the accident, but 
she did go over to where the plaintiff was lying and 
screaming. Myrna said: "Don't let me die." l\lyrna 
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:1.-'.~<·d ~~ r:-; .. \hnberg to tell her hoy friend. She told ~Irs . 
. \lmberg that her back hurt and her leg hurt. ~Irs. Ahn-
herg said .Mr. Green cmne up and said: 
"( 
1ome on. Let's get the hell out of here." 
anfl ~~ yrna said: 
"l hate you. I hate you. I told you not to go 
so fast.'' (R. 293-296). 
Bert Singleton, a policeman, the mnbulance driver, 
te~tified after he picked the girl up she cmnplained that 
her leg was in great pain and on several occasions during 
the ride to the hospital said that she had asked the driver 
to ~low dmvn (R. 301). :Myrna Rodriguez, after the acci-
dent was under shock (R. 199). The ambulance caine and 
took her to the General Hospital. When she woke up she 
found she had a cast on her leg. The hospital report 
:-;l10ws that she had a compound fracture of the right tibia 
and fibula, distal third, and fracture of the right first 
metatarsal and fifth proximal phalanx of the right foot, 
that she had wounds beneath the right knee and multiple 
lacerations, abrasions and ecchymoses over the body 
(Exhibit 10). She was in the hospital for over two weeks 
( R. 199-202). 
Dr. Lamb figured her permanent partial disability 
would be from 5% to 7% (R. 120-121). 
The plaintiff, :Myrna Rodriguez, testified that before 
they reached I Street on their ride, she asked Mr. Green 
if he would slow down, and that he did slow down, and 
this was before they stopped for gas (R. 199). After 
leaving the service station, .J1 yrna said he did not drive 
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the Inotorcycle fast and he did not travel fa::;t an~· tiHH-' 
going up I Street, and that .he, was driving reasonably 
and carefully after he left the :service station and went 
north ori I Street (H. 207) .. ' She \vas' positive s~w onlY 
' \ ' . ,_ ~ 
told hi1n once to slow down (H. 209). 
S~rATE:MEN1, OF POINTS rPu:; r.~HICll 
PLAINTIFF RELII.JH 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT, HAZEL CHASE, WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE IS-
SUES IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN 
·REGARD TO THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK, INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 1, 16, AND 17. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INJECTING INTO THE CASE 
THE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, LAST T\VO LINES OF 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 AND SUBDIVISIONS 3, 4, AND 6 OF 
iNSTRUCTION NO. 17. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
u REGARDING UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
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ARGtT_MENT 
POINT I.~ 
THE DEFENDANT, HAZEL .CHASE, WAS NEGLIGENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY TO FIND THE IS-
SUES IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE 
DEFENDANT. 
't,:le plaintiff, Myrna Hodriguez, was a guest of Mr. 
On'Pn, the driver of the Inotorcycle. She had no control 
over him; she had no control over the operation of the 
motor[·yele; therefore, the proximate cause of the colli-
~ion must be the sole negligence of her host to bar her 
recovery frorn the defendant, :Mrs. Chase. On the other 
hand, if the proxi1nate cause of the collision was either 
(a) the sole negligence of the defendant, Mrs. Chase, or 
(b) the concurrent negligence of Mr. Green and the de-
fendant .Jlrs. Chase, then the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover. Capero·n v. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P.(2d) 402. 
The jury was unable to assess this case on that basis 
due to the lower Court's erroneous instructions regarding 
( 1) unavoidable accident, ( :2) assumption of risk, and 
( 3) contributory negligence. 
Let us look to the record. I Street is a through high-
way and the east and west traffic on Eleventh A venue 
is regulated by stop signs (~ee Exhibit 1). 
41-6-7 +, Utah Code Annotated 1953: 
Vehicle entering a through highway. - The 
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this 
act at the entrance to a through highway and shall 
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yield the right-of-way to other vehicles ·which haV(-~ 
entered the intersection from said through higll-
way or which are approaching so closely on said 
through highway as to constitute an immediatE' 
hazard, but said driver having so yielded may 
proceed and the drivers of all other vehicles ap-
proaching the intersection on said through high-
way shall yield the right-of-way to the vehiclf' 
so proceeding into or across the throug:h highway. 
(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise 
stop in obedience to a stop sign as required herein 
at an intersection where a stop sign is erecterl 
at one or more entrances thereto although not n 
part of a through highway and shall proceed c~~l­
tiously, yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop 
which are within the intersection or approacl1ing 
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, 
but may then proceed. 
Yernon Green, the operator of the motorcycle, was 
the favored driver. IIe had a right to presu1ne that tlw 
disfavored driver, Mrs. Chase, who was either coming 
to a stop or who had stopped at the stop sign, would 
allow hiin to pass. As he approached Eleventh Avenue, he 
saw the Chase cai; and he knew there was a stop sign and 
he took it for granted that if he could see the car, thr 
car could see him, and knowing that he ,\·as favored with 
a stop sign he proeeeded on. Bate:) r. Burns, 3 Utah 2nrl 
180, 281 P(2d) 209; Comnb,-.· r. Perry, :2 Ftah 381, 275 P. 
(2d) (iRO; Peterson 1'. Xielson, 9 l""tah 2nd 302~ 343 P(2d) 
7i~1. 
rrhe plaintiff realize~ that thi~ right of way i~ not 
ah~olute and undPr pro1•<'l' ('irrnm~h:ln(·e~ the dif;fayored 
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drin·1·, ~\I r:-;. ClH~:se, eould becmne the favored driver. 
'I';) do ~o, she would have to comply with the provisions 
ot' tl:.• statute. S!w must yield to vehicles not so obliged 
to ~'top \\·hieh are within the intersection or approaching 
-;o <·lo~el~- as to constitute an in1n1ediate hazard . ... Uartin 
r. S!e·vens, 1:21 etah -!84, 2-t:1 P(2d) 747. 
Did the defendant, ~Irs. Chase, ever becmne the 
[':lV()l'(•(1 driver~ The answer is "No.,, rrhe defendant, 
~-.~ rs. ( 'has<•, knew the interseetion of I Street and 
l~lpv,,nfl Avenue was a dangerous inter;:Jedion. She knew 
ft::: visibility frmn the south vvas poor (R. 1G9-170), 
;;~t,1 ~;~w l~new that the only place that she could expect 
danger was fron1 the south. She stopped at the stop 
~iga. ~he rould not hecmne the favored driver and pro-
l'e,;;l until she had yielded to whatever vehicle was within 
t::,, intcr~'edion or approaching so closely as to constitute 
an immediate hazard. In order to detennine whether 
or not there 'vas an innnediate hazard, she had to look 
and also listen. The collision proved there was an iin-
mediate hazard. .Jf rs. Chase didn't hear the motorcyc!e 
nor did ~he see it until the collision. She stated to the 
officer that she had stopped right still, looked both ways, 
and this nwtorcycle "came out of the blue." She felt the 
motorcycle hit the car and fly across the street. She had 
just barely started up (R. 137). She told the police offi-
<·er that right before the impact she was going five to ten 
miles per hour (R. 140). She didn't hear the roar of the 
motorcycle and she didn't see any lights coming over the 
hill. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
This court has said on numerous occasions that a 
driver of a vehicle is chargeable with what he would have 
seen if he had looked. Reid v. Owens, 98 Utah 50, 93 P. 
(2d) 680; Johnson 1./. Syme, 6 Utah 2nd 319, 313 P (2d) 
468; Richards r. Anderson, 9 Utah 2nd 17, 337 P(2d) 
59. 
While the Utah cases do not con1e right out and say 
so, it is reasonable to assume that the driver is charge-
able with what he would have heard had he listened. 
1:frs. Arrnstrong heard the roar of the motorcycle as 
she approached the stop sign. She dramatically stated 
that she heard the n1otorcycle as she approached the stop 
sign to make her stop and she remembered sitting there 
with "an apprehensive feeling as a fire engine makes yon 
feel when you hear the noise you don't see" (R. 149-151). 
Carl Ahnberg, a defense witness, clain1ed he first 
savl'" the motorcycle as it was coming into the intersection 
when he was fifty feet west of I Street, but he heard the 
motorcycle a few seconds before he saw it, probably two 
or three seconds (R. 253-254), so it appears certain that 
the defendant should have heard this motorcycle. 
Should the defendant have seen the motorcycle? 
l~xhibit No. 2 is a photo, marked picture No. 1, and ·wa~ 
taken while the can1era was held about four feet three 
inches front the ground at a point 155 feet south from the 
center of Eleventh A venue. Exhibit No. 3, picture No. 2. 
was taken front the same elevation 129 feet south of the 
center of l~leventh Avenue. Exhibit No. -!, picture No. 
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3, was taken 88 feet south from the center of I Street. 
Exhibit No. 5, picture No. 4, was taken 9 feet east of the 
stop sign and 3 feet north of the center of Eleventh 
Avenue, looking southwesterly. Exhibit No. 6, picture 
~ o. 5, was taken from the same place and looking south-
westerly. Exhibit No. 7, picture No. 6, was taken 3 feet 
north of the center of I Street and looking southwesterly. 
I~xhibit No. 8, picture No. 7, was taken 3 feet north of 
the center line of Eleventh A venue and 9 feet east of the 
stop sign, looking northwest up Eleventh Avenue. Ex-
hibit No. 9, picture No. 8, was taken east of I Street 
intersection looking west. These pictures demonstrate 
beyond a peradventure of a doubt that had Mrs. Chase 
been looking, she could have observed the motorcycle 
coming up I Street for a distance 1nuch over 155 feet 
( R. 91-93). 
1Ir. Green estimated his speed at twenty-five miles 
per hour as he approached the intersection, and about 
twenty 1niles per hour at the time of impact. His maxi-
mum speed going north on I Street was thirty miles per 
hour (R. 233-234). Mr. Nichols, the schoolteacher, also 
testified that the motorcycle was going at a reasonable 
and safe speed and not over thirty miles per hour (R. 
160-165). The only person that gives the plaintiff speed 
of forty to fifty miles an hour was :\Ir. Ahnberg who 
made his estimation of the speed from seeing the motor-
cycle travel approximately twenty-five feet (R. 253-
254). He said it was going forty to fifty miles an hour. 
If :Mr. Green had been going that fast, the motorcycle 
would never have stopped where it did. 
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rJ~he plaintiff in this case dofts not have to prove that 
:1\Irs~ Cha:se, the defendant, was solely responsible for 
the accident. Even if Mr. Green, the host driver for the 
plaintiff, was negligent, that would not absolve I\lr~. 
Chase's liability to the plaintiff. Suppose Mrs. Chase waf-: 
suing :Mr. Green? The answer would be: She couldn't 
recover because of her contributory negligence in failing 
to look, failing to listen, and crossing the intersection 
before she could determine that a northbound vehicle was 
not an immediate hazard. 
The plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdiet 
against the defendant. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY IN 
REGARD TO THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK, INSTRUCTIONS 
NOS. 1, 16, AND 17. 
In Instruction No. 1, the court in setting out the de-
fendant'~ contention, instructed as follows: 
As a seeond affinnative defense the defendant 
alleges that the plaintiff herself was guilty of 
contributory negligence which proxiinately con-
tributed to her injuries and as a third affirmative 
defense that the plaintiff entered upon the trip 
·with her driver Vernon Green and that she by 
reason of the ei rcumstances assumed the risk of 
in;jur~- and damage to her person under certain 
circumstances as follows: 
(a) By continuing to ride on the motoreyclf• 
\rhen it was being driven at an exeessive rate of 
speed and in a manner showing that the driver 
could not control it. or hring it to a ~top in tlu· 
<'VI'Jlt of danger~ and 
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to get off the vehicle before the accident occurred~ 
(R. 45-46). 
Instruction No. 16. 
There is a legal principle cornnwnly referred 
to by the tenu ''assumption of risk," which is as 
follows: 
One is said to assume a risk when she volun-
tarily manifests her assent to the creation or 
maintenance of a dangerous condition and volun-
tarily exposes herself to that danger, or when she 
knows, or in the exercise of ordinary care "'\vould 
know, that a danger exists in either the condition 
of nnot:wr, or in the condition, use, or operation 
l)f property and voluntarily places herself or re--
mains, within the position of danger. 
One who has thus assumed a risk is not en-
titled to recover for damages caused her without 
intention and which results from t 11e dangerous 
<'ondition or conduct to which she thus exposed 
herself. (R. 63). 
Then the court again repeated the a~sumption of 
ri:-:k in ~ubdivision G of Instruction No. 17: 
If the plaintiff rtssumed the risk of danger 
111entioned elsewhere in these instructions and it 
/Cas the ]Jroximate ca~tse of her injuri·es she can-
not recover. 
This was the second ride that the plaintiff, J\Iyrna 
Bodriguez, had ever had on a motorcycle. At one point 
before they reached I Street, she asked :Jlr. Green if he 
would slow down. This was before they stopped for gas 
1 R. 199). After that, Myrna said he did not drive the 
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motorcycle fast and he did not go fast up I Street, and 
that he was driving reasonable and careful. Mr. Green 
testified that as he turned onto Third A venue, he started 
picking up speed and the plaintiff asked him to slow 
down and he did. 
Mrs. Chase and other witnesses testified to the hy-
sterical statements made by the plaintiff while she \Ya~ 
in a state of shock with a broken leg. The testimony 
of Mr. Nichols, the schoolteacher, was that the rnotorcycle 
was going at a reasonable and safe speed up I Street. 
The physical facts, that is the distance the rnotorcycle 
went after the collision, show that :.Mr. Green was not 
going at an excessive speed. 
This court in the cases of Clay t:. Dunford, 121 lTtal1 
177, 239 P(2d) 1075, and Johnson 1: ... Uaynard, 9 rtal1 
2nd 268, 342 P(2d) 884, has ably discussed the theory 
and development of the doctrine of the assurnption of 
risk and also has discussed the conunon error of some 
courts to confuse contributory negligence with assump-
tion of risk. As was said in Clay 'C. Du uford, supra: 
"It is necessary that the plaintiff not only 
knew and appreciated the danger, but voluntarily 
put herself in the way of it." 
Or putting it in another way, it must clearly show (1) a 
palpably dangerous condition, (2) knowledge and appre-
ciation of the danger, and (3) a voluntary act by plaintiff 
showing that he was willing to take the chance. 
As wa~ said in Jolinso.ll c. llla.1nzard, supra: 
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''The fundamental consideration underlying 
it is that one should not be permitted to knowing-
ly and voluntarily incur an obvious risk of per-
sonal harm when he has the ability to avoid doing 
so, and then hold another responsible for his in-
jur~·. Its essential elements are: knowledge of a 
danger and a free and voluntary consent to as-
surne it." 
.\s was said in the sarne case: 
"Under any reasonable view of the evidence 
here the conduct of the plaintiff would not fall 
within the requisites of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk. This was the type of hazard which would 
exist at practically every intersection where there 
is rnuch traffic." 
1 t is i1nportant to recall that in the assumption of 
ri~k case there truly must be recognized by the plaintiff 
the sp('cific risk that he was taking. A general knowledge 
nf the danger or hazard of his occupation will not suffice. 
f(iugu·ell v. Hart, 275 P(2d) 431, Supreme Court of 
\Vashington, October 15, 1954. This case discusses as-
~nmption of risk. Here the plaintiff was being driven by 
defendant in defendant's car. Defendant became sleepy 
and plaintiff knew he was sleepy. Finally the defendant 
went to sleep and the automobile left the highway, seri-
ously injuring plaintiff. The case was tried and the court 
found that defendant was negligent in falling asleep 
and the plaintiff voluntarily assumed any and all risks 
and dangers in riding in defendant's automobile at the 
time of the accident. The case was dismissed. Supreme 
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Court reversed the. case and ~emanded it to determi;H· 
plaintiff's damages. The court held that 
"(1) The doctrine of assumption of risk as it i~ 
ordinarily understood is not· applicable under 
a tort case like the one at bar, because of 
the absence of 1naster and servant or o~~1cr 
contractual relationships. rrlle designa~imt 
'voluntary exposure to unreasonable risk' i~­
nwre nearly correct, in that it implies tl-::e elP-
rnent of wilful assent expressed by t}re maxiHl 
volenti non fit injuria-no wrong is done t(l 
one who consents. 
( 2) rrhe inquiry in a tort ra~e, presenti:1g tL, 
issues raised on this appeal n1ay include thre<' 
questions : Did plaintiff ( 1) ln1m~~ of anr1 
appreciate the danger or risk involved, and 
also (2) did he voluntarily cons2nt to exvJ~~(· 
himself to it 'voluntarily' including the mean-
ing that defendant's conduct has left plain-
tift a reasonable election or alternative, and 
( 3; was the exposure unreasonable, that i:-:. 
was it such that a reasonable person in plain-
tiff's position would not expose himself to 
it, or, after accepting a reasonable risk, did 
plaintiff exercise proper care for his own pro-
tection against that risk." 
l_n nwst of the ease~ this assurnption of risk wa.,; 
either direeted against the guest in favor of a host driver 
or in eases of one driver against another. There are very 
few eases wherein the third party has endeavored to avail 
himself of this doetrine against the guest. One of the few 
eases i~ King v. City of Long Beaeh, District Court of 
Appeals, Herond Distrid California, 19--t-+.1 :)3 P ( ~ l) --t--F)_ 
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Hankins was a guest of the driver ICing. King drove in 
h~ae!\o::t without lights at high speed. Hankins didn't ob-
jf' ·t to speed and Hankins had two opportunities to get 
out before the accident. King collided with a car driven 
hy a policeman of the City of Long Beach. The court 
~aid: 
''I Iankins was bound to exercise ordinary care 
for his own safety. \Vhether or not he exercised 
~uch care is primarily a question of fact. The trial 
<·,~urt has decided that question against the plain-
tiff .... Fnder such circumstances the finding may 
not he disturbed." 
T:1c above case was not decided on the theory of assump-
tion of risk but strictly on the theory of contributory 
negligence. 
The "assuu1ption of risk" doctrine inserted into this 
~·a~e \\·as not justified by either the law or the evidence, 
and it constituted prejudicial error. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN INJE.CTING INTO THE CASE 
"i'HE QUESTION OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ON 
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF, LAST TWO LINES OF 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13 AND SUBDIVISIONS 3, 4, AND 6 OF 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17. 
Instruction No. 13 was a correct statement of the law. 
The Court stated in the first paragraph that the negli-
gence of Green would not bar plaintiff's recovery unless 
his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the acci-
dent; it went on to say that if both Mr. Green and the 
defendant, Mrs. Chase, were negligent plaintiff would be 
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entitled to recover. The prejudicial part of the instruc-
tion then follows: 
"unless she was also negligent which proximately 
contributed to the collision.'' 
There was no evidence as to any negligence of the plain-
tiff, 1\Iyrna Rodriguez. She was a guest. 
We have discussed the assumption of risk, supra, 
and can see that the plaintiff was not contributorily 
negligent in assuming any risk. The jury was given the 
idea that somewhere along the line she contributed to the 
accident. They might have thought she was negligent 
by not jumping off the motorcycle. The jury might have 
felt that she was guilty of contributory negligence by 
even getting on a motorcycle. What possibly could have 
been her contributory negligence~ 
The words complained of took all the meaning out of 
Instruction No. 13. Theodore Roosevelt often used the 
term "weasel words" to designate words that suck all 
the life out of the words next to them, just as a weasel 
sucks an egg and leaves the shell. 
Then in Instruction No. 17 in subdivisions 3 and 4: 
3. If all three parties were negligent and 
each proximately contrilmted to the plaintiff's 
injuries tl1en the plaintiff cmmot recot·er. 
4. If the plaintiff u·as negligent and it u·ns 
a pro.rimate cause of her injuries she cannot re-
cover. 
Thus, contributory negligence was again injected into the 
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case. These instructions on contributory negligence tend-
(•(l to divert the minds of the jurors from the fact that the 
plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the accident was 
caused hy the sole negligence of the defendant or by the 
concurrent negligence of Mr. Green and the defendant. 
They suggested to the jury that s01newhere along the line, 
in son1e Inanner that could only be discerned by the trial 
court, the plaintiff might have been contributorily negli-
gent. They practically amounted to an argument by the 
eourt. These instructions had no more place in this case 
than a lecture by the court to the jury on the evils of 
motorcycles and delinquency of teenagers, and the result 
was just as prejudicial as though such a lecture had been 
given. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
5 REGARDING UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT. 
Jury should not ordinarily be given instruction on 
unavoidable accident. Such an instruction is unnecessary, 
hecause a defense of unavoidable accident is nothing more 
than a denial by the defendant of negligence, or a con-
tention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate 
eause of the injury, and the ordinary instructions on 
negligence and proximate cause sufficiently show that 
plaintiff must sustain his burden of proof on these issues 
in order to recover. Such an instruction is also confus-
ing, because the jury may get the impression that un-
avoidability is an issue to be decided and that, if proved, 
it constitutes a separate ground of nonliability of the 
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def~nda,n t, and th~ .r;ule,s• GO.:Q.Cen;ting neg~igence and pi'oxi-
mat~ causat~on are in the1llselve~ complicated and diffi-
cult to understand. B,,utigarz, v. Yellqw Cab Co., 320 P(2d) 
500, 65 .. ALR .2d 1 . (Qal. 1958), :oyerr,uling prior decisio:1 
to the contrary. 
The.Jie. is. :no evidence in this case to support such an 
instruction. This accident occurred in an intersection and 
it was due to the negligence of either Mr. Green, :Mr~. 
Chase, or both. The instruction serves no useful purposP 
and it overemphasizes the defense of the defendant and it 
was confusing. It amounts to the court giving an argu-
ment for the defense. 
vV e call the court's attention to the annotation follow-
ing the Butigan case in ALR. This annotation is over 
one hundred pages, and deals with this question thoro-
ughly. The annotation has endeavored to list almost 
every conceivable facet and list the cases where the in-
struction may be given, where it. can't be given, where 
the instruction is proper under certain evidence, where 
it is error to give the instruction unless there is evidence 
to support it, etc. The writers respectfully submit that 
the theory advanced by the California Supreme Court 
in the Butigan case is proper and should be followed by 
thi~ Court. However, there seems to be no doubt that 
to give this instruction where there is no evidence to 
justify it is error. 
\Vhat cmuplicates this ease 1nore than the ordinary 
i~ tlw fact that the plaintiff is a guest. For instance, the 
theory of HO~tw ('ourt~ iH that if the defendant i8 free from 
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neglig-PHee it should be given. In the guest case that could 
~o both ways. Tn the guest case if the jury believed that 
the host driver was not negligent then it might feel that 
it :-;hould find an unavoidable accident even though the 
third party were negligent. 
The instruction in this case was uncalled for, con-
fusing, and prejudicial. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has again and again connnitted itself to 
t :1(' doctrine that the driver of a vehicle is chargeable 
with what he would have seen had he looked. The defend-
ant was the disfavored driver. She stopped at the stop 
~ign, and without looking or deter1nining what vehicle 
eoming up I Street 1night be a hazard, proceeded blindly 
across the intersection. This conclusion is inescapable. 
The testimony and the pictures confinn this. However, 
owing to the erroneous action of the lo·wer Court in 
injecting (a) assun1ption of risk, (b) contributory negli-
g-ence, and (c) unavoidable accident, the plaintiff as far as 
the jury was concerned lost her favored position of being 
a guest. She was placed on the smne footing as her host 
driver, Green. The jury, confused by the instructions, held 
that way. 
In view of this Court's previous decisions, it follows 
that the lower Court erred in instructing the jury as to 
assmnption of risk, which decisions were called to the 
lower Court's attention in the nwtion for new trial. It 
has been a custom in this locality for defendants to ask 
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for and receive in ahnost every tort case the instruction 
on unavoidable accident. The plaintiff respectfully sub-
mits that this Court should hold that this instruction 
should never be given unless the evidence in fact showed 
that the accident could have been "\vhat we term "unavoid-
able." 
The plaintiff further contends that there was not a 
scintilla of evidence on which to base the instructions 
on contributory negligence. 
The plaintiffs respectfully sub1nit that the Court 
should reverse this case and hold that the defendant was 
negligent as a n1atter of law, leaving only the damages 
to be detennined. However, if the Court feels that there 
is a jury question on defendant's negligence, then re-
mand the case for a ne:w trial under proper instructions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY S. McCARTY & 
SUMNER J. HATCH 
.Atto'l'neys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
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